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Since 1999, IMF staff have been tracking several early warning system (EWS) mod-
els of currency crisis. The results have been mixed. One of the long-horizon models
has performed well relative to pure guesswork and to available non-model-based
forecasts, such as agency ratings and private analysts’currency crisis risk scores.
The data do not speak clearly on the other long-horizon EWS model. The two
short-horizon private sector models generally performed poorly. [JEL F31, F47]
R
esearch on developing early warning system (EWS) models of currency cri-
sis received a strong stimulus in recent years following the Mexican and
Asian crises. Both events took the international community somewhat by surprise
and thus focused attention on indicators and methods that could assist in the timely
identification of highly vulnerable countries. Since the beginning of 1999, IMF
staff has been systematically tracking, on an ongoing basis, various models devel-
oped in-house and by private institutions, as part of a broader forward-looking 
vulnerability assessment.
EWS models play a necessarily small part in vulnerability assessment rela-
tive to more detailed country-specific analyses. We do not review the IMF’s expe-ASSESSING EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS: HOW HAVE THEY WORKED IN PRACTICE?
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rience with the broader vulnerability assessment process here.1 The question we
are interested in, and to which we return in the conclusion, is whether EWS mod-
els have any role to play at all.2
This paper looks in detail at the performance of these models in practice to
date. We emphasize the distinction between in-sample and out-of-sample predic-
tion. For an EWS model to be a useful tool in monitoring vulnerabilities, it must
hold up in real time, after the model has been formulated. We thus focus on the
actual forecasts made since 1999, though we also reexamine the run-up to the Asia
crisis.
A typical result from our earlier studies was that, while the model forecasts we
reexamine here were statistically significant predictors of crises, whether they were
economically significant was harder to say. In other words, the forecasts were infor-
mative compared with a benchmark of complete random guessing, but it was less
clear whether they were useful to an already informed observer. It is reasonable to
suppose that comprehensive, country-specific holistic assessments by informed ana-
lysts, based on all available qualitative and quantitative information, must be better
than inevitably simple EWS models. Indeed the ability to take all the information
into account is clearly a huge potential advantage. But there have been no studies
on whether such comprehensive assessments are in fact better. We gain perspective
on this issue here by comparing EWS model forecasts to non-model-based indica-
tors, such as bond spreads, agency ratings, and risk scores published by analysts.
I. EWS Models
Policy initiatives to monitor indicators of external vulnerability can be traced to
the Mexican peso crisis of December 1994. A seminal effort to use a systematic
quantitative early warning system to predict currency crises was the “indicators”
model of Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998). The Asia crises of 1997/98
provided further impetus for the effort. Evidence suggested that despite the daunt-
ing challenges involved in this sort of exercise, this kind of model had some suc-
cess in predicting these crises out of sample (Berg and Pattillo, 1999a). It also
suggested that a variety of improvements could substantially improve model per-
formance (Berg and Pattillo, 1999b).
In light of this research, IMF staff has implemented various models to predict
currency and balance of payments crises since 1999, as described in Berg and oth-
ers (2000). IMF staff has also tracked various private sector models, including
Goldman Sachs’GS-WATCH and Credit Suisse First Boston’s Emerging Markets
Risk Indicator, and a more recent model, the Deutsche Bank Alarm Clock. Table 1
summarizes the main features of the models under consideration here. It details
1Some discussion of the role of EWS models in broader vulnerability assessment can be found in IMF
(2002) and in Berg and others (2000).
2Predicting currency crises is closely related to predicting exchange rate movements, so any success
of EWS models is notable in the context of the extensive literature, starting with Meese and Rogoff (1983),
which has shown how difficult it is to predict exchange rates out of sample. Berg and others (2000) dis-
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the crisis definition employed, the prediction horizon, the method used to gener-
ate predictions, and the predictor variables. Appendix I contains a more complete
description of the models. Table A.1 shows all the crisis dates for these models
since January 1999.3
As Table 1 illustrates, the specification of EWS models involves a number of
decisions that, while guided in some way by economic theory, are largely empiri-
cal and judgmental in nature. Currency crises, for example, are not precisely
defined events, but the models must nonetheless define crisis dates in terms of the
data. (See Box 1 for a discussion of how the different models implement the cur-
rency crisis concept.) The choice of a prediction horizon depends on the objectives
of the user. The in-house models adopt a relatively long horizon, which should
allow time for policy changes that may prevent the crisis. The time horizon of pri-
vate sector models is shorter and their criterion for evaluating the accuracy of pre-
dictions (frequently, a trading rule) is sometimes different. Nevertheless, it is still
informative to consider the predictions from private sector EWS models when
assessing vulnerability, especially because those predictions are disseminated
widely within the investor community.
The predictive variables in the models are inspired by theories of balance of
payments crises but constrained by data availability, but in the end reflect what
works best in fitting the data. The choice of statistical method is an essentially
empirical decision. Appendix I discusses considerations that apply to these speci-
fication choices with special reference to the models tracked in the IMF.
II. The Value Added of EWS Models
Since early 1999 the IMF has been regularly producing forecasts from two EWS
models, the Kaminsky-Lizondo-Reinhart (KLR) and the Developing Country
Studies Division (DCSD), and monitoring two private sector models, the Goldman
Sachs (GS) and Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB). This section examines the use-
fulness of these models in providing early warnings of crises.
The evaluation of EWS models requires a benchmark. Typically the question
is whether a model provides a statistically and economically significant prediction
of crisis. This might appear to be a low standard to meet. Given the difficulties
involved in crisis prediction, however, it is ambitious. To forecast crises reliably
implies systematically outperforming the market at predicting sudden changes in
the exchange rate.
Assessments must focus on out-of-sample performance. Successful in-sample
predictions are much easier to achieve than out-of-sample predictions but much
less meaningful. First, the diligent analyst may have searched through enough truly
unrelated variables until finding some that, by coincidence, happen to be corre-
3More recently, other models have been developed at the IMF, such as Mulder, Perrelli, and Rocha
(2002) and Abiad (2003). Other recent developments include models designed to predict other sorts of
crises, such as Manasse, Roubini, and Schimmelpfennig (2003). For a review of recent developments in
this literature, see Abiad (2003).ASSESSING EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS: HOW HAVE THEY WORKED IN PRACTICE?
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Box 1. Crisis Definition
The early warning system (EWS) models considered in this paper attempt to predict
currency crises, as distinct from other sorts of crises, such as debt and banking
crises. Although opinions differ as to what constitutes a currency crisis and when
one is observed, the formulation of an EWS model requires a specific quantitative
definition (Table 1 briefly describes the crisis definitions for the models discussed in
detail in this paper. Table A.1 lists all the crisis dates for the various models for the
1999–2001 period (1999–2002 for DCSD and KLR)).
Models that attempt to predict only successful speculative attacks, such as that
of Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB), define crises solely by sufficiently large
changes in the exchange rate over a short period of time. For a private sector institu-
tion, predicting sudden large changes in the exchange rate alone may be the main
objective. EWS models implemented by the IMF, as well as the Goldman-Sachs
(GS) model, attempt to predict both successful and unsuccessful speculative attacks
by calculating an “exchange market pressure” index that combines exchange rate
and reserve changes.
For the CSFB model, a crisis occurs when the exchange rate moves by more
than some threshold amount over a short period of time (see Table 1). For the in-
house models, a crisis occurs when the exchange market pressure index is very high
relative to its historical average.1 The GS model also defines a crisis as an index
value that is high relative to a country-specific threshold, with the threshold defined
so as to separate calm periods from those of unusual volatility. The GS definition
tends to produce more frequent crises, often occurring for several consecutive peri-
ods, while the Developing Country Studies Division (DCSD) and the Kaminsky-
Lizondo-Reinhart (KLR) crises are almost always isolated. Comparing over a
common sample of 16 countries from 1996 through mid-2001, the CSFB crisis defi-
nition produces 34 crises, the DCSD/KLR definition produces 34 crises, and the GS
definition 150 crises, with the latter grouped into 47 distinct episodes of one or more
consecutive crisis months.
The omission of interest rates in the crisis definitions for most emerging market
EWSs, because of poor availability of historical data on market-determined interest
rates, is increasingly recognized as a shortcoming in identifying crises. For example,
the 1995 attack on the Argentine peso in the wake of the “tequila” effect was the
kind of event the models should attempt to predict. However, this failed attack,
which was evidenced mainly by a rapid increase in domestic interest rates, is not
identified as a crisis by many EWS models. The Deutsche Bank Alarm Clock
(DBAC) defines substantial exchange rate depreciations and interest rate increases
as separate events but jointly estimates the probability of these two types of events.
However, the model uses International Financial Statistics (IFS) data on money
market interest rates, which are deficient for many emerging economies.
1Taking into account whether the crisis index is high relative to its history in a particular coun-
try has an advantage relative to defining a crisis by the same absolute cutoff depreciation for all coun-
tries. For example, for a country that has had a pegged exchange rate regime and where the rate has
remained fixed for some time, a relatively small devaluation might be considered a crisis. The same
size depreciation might not constitute a crisis in a country where the exchange rate is flexible and has
been more volatile.Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Pattillo
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lated with crises in this particular sample. Such a spurious relationship is not likely
to persist in a new sample.4 Second, even if a true relationship is found in the sam-
ple, the next set of crises may be fundamentally different from the last. A model
that provides accurate out-of-sample forecasts has thus passed a much tougher
test. Of course, only models passing this test are useful for actual crisis prediction.
For these reasons, the focus here is on out-of-sample testing.
In this section, several approaches to testing these models are pursued. First,
the stage is set by a review of the performance of a model designed prior to the
Asia crises, KLR, in predicting those crises. Following earlier work, the model is
implemented as it might have been in early 1997 and forecasts are compared with
actual outcomes. These predictions are compared with those implied by spreads
on dollar-denominated sovereign bonds and sovereign credit ratings as well as the
assessments of currency crisis risks produced by country experts from the Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit (EIU). These results suggest that the EWS models show
promise. The KLR model decisively outperforms all the non-EWS based compara-
tors in this period.
The second part of the section, and the core of the paper, looks at the how the
various models that have been monitored at the IMF since early 1999 have per-
formed in this period. First is a detailed analysis of the first set of forecasts officially
produced within the IMF, in May 1999. These are compared with the alternative
indicators, such as bond spreads, ratings, and analysts’ views described above,
where possible. We follow with a more systematic examination of how well the
models have predicted crises over the full out-of-sample period.
4Similarly, models are likely to find an “overvaluation” of the exchange rate before currency crises
when the long-run, or equilibrium, exchange rate is calculated, as is usual, as some form of average value
over the estimation period that includes the crisis events. Evaluating the out-of-sample performance of the
models also avoids any overstatement of the predictive value of the models through this channel.
Box 1. (Concluded)
It is unlikely that any simple formula, however well thought out, will always be
successful in picking out crisis periods in the data. One possible improvement would
be to combine the results from the quantitative definition with country-specific
knowledge about exchange market developments to make some adjustments to the
dating of crisis periods. Events that are close calls according to the crisis formula
could receive particular scrutiny, and the analyst might judge whether to label some
of these as crises. For example, Sri Lanka suffered a reserve loss of about 40 percent
during 2000, along with a currency depreciation of nearly 15 percent, culminating in
the abandonment of the crawling band exchange rate regime and further currency
depreciation in January 2001. Because no single month was sufficiently traumatic,
however, the formula employed in the KLR and DCSD models registered a fairly
close call, but not a crisis. This episode might have been called a crisis if it had been
assessed “by hand.”ASSESSING EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS: HOW HAVE THEY WORKED IN PRACTICE?
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EWS Models and Alternative Indicators in the Asia Crisis
Berg and others (2000) looked at various measures of performance of a variety of
EWS models, focusing in particular on their ability to predict the Asia crises of
1997–98 out of sample.5 One main conclusion was that the original KLR model,
which was designed prior to 1997 and hence without the benefit of hindsight, had
substantial predictive power over the Asian episodes. Column 1 of Table 2 shows
the ranking of countries according to the risk of currency crisis that KLR would
have produced in early 1997. These forecasts are fairly good, with many of the
most vulnerable countries in fact being the hardest hit in terms of crisis severity.6
For example, Korea and Thailand were among the top third of countries in terms
of vulnerability, according to the KLR model. Although Brazil and the Philip-
pines, which were not hit particularly hard over this period, were at the top of 
the vulnerability table, the forecasts are informative overall. Country rank in the
predicted vulnerability list is a statistically significant predictor of actual crisis
incidence.
One lesson from Berg and others (2000) and other work is that there was clear
scope for improvement of those earlier models. A variety of potentially important
crisis indicators had not been tested, such as the current account deficit as a share
of GDP and the ratio of short-term external debt to GDP. Moreover, regression-
based estimation techniques that more fully exploit the information in the data
seemed a promising alternative to the “indicator”-based method of the KLR
model. A revamped KLR-based model and the DCSD model described in section
I were the result of an effort to improve on the original KLR model. Not surpris-
ingly, given the benefit of hindsight, these models perform substantially better in
predicting the Asia crises (Column 2 of Table 2 presents results for the DCSD
model).
The predictions of EWS models were significantly better than random guesses
in predicting the Asia crises, but they were not overwhelmingly accurate. How, in
comparison, did the various non-model-based indicators fare over this period?
Among these, sovereign spreads are a commonly watched indicator of country
risk. While the spreads are important indicators of market access, and also market
sentiment, they do not fare particularly well as currency crisis predictors over this
period. The most affected countries had generally lower pre-crisis spreads as of
the first quarter of 1997, as shown in the third column of Table 2. The spread aver-
aged 90 basis points in the countries that subsequently suffered a crisis, while it
averaged 201 in the other countries.7
5See also Berg and Pattillo (1999c) on the implications of EWS models for the Asia crisis.
6The measure of the severity of crisis for a particular country is the maximum value reached by the
exchange market pressure index in 1997, where the index itself is a weighted average of the depreciation
of the exchange rate and the loss of international reserves.
7Although one could rationalize the low sovereign spreads in the Asian economies on the basis of their
relatively low levels of external debt, spreads did increase after October 1997, suggesting that markets may
have underestimated risks. The period before the Asian crises was characterized by unusually low spreads
for almost all emerging market economies.Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Pattillo
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Table 2. Risk Assessments Prior to the Asia Crisis Based on KLR, DCSD,
Bond Spread, Credit Rating, and the Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU) Forecasts
Spread4 Rating5 EIU 1997 Q1 
Country1 KLR2 DCSD3 1997 Q1 1997 Q1 Currency Risk6
Korea, Rep. of 22 24 50 18 22
Thailand 20 40 51 25 42
Indonesia 16 32 109 43 38
Malaysia 14 39 37 20 36
Zimbabwe 19 n.a. n.a. n.a. 58
Philippines 34 14 165 55 36
Taiwan Province of China 23 46 n.a. n.a. 12
Colombia 15 41 129 45 35
India 10 21 n.a. n.a. 35
Brazil 31 15 233 65 51
Turkey 16 18 416 66 56
Venezuela 14 9 n.a. n.a. 53
Pakistan 20 36 n.a. 68 49
South Africa 19 26 85 48 39
Jordan 14 15 n.a. n.a. 61
Sri Lanka 12 17 n.a. n.a. 43
Chile 11 14 n.a. n.a. 17
Bolivia 10 5 n.a. n.a. 37
Argentina 14 11 265 63 59
Mexico 14 8 231 55 55
Peru 20 26 n.a. 70 51
Uruguay 10 14 135 50 37
Israel 14 24 44 30 46
Average
Crisis countries 20 34 90 34 35
Non-crisis countries 15 17 201 57 46
Rank correlation7 0.52 0.53 −0.31 −0.49 −0.33
Source: Authors’ calculations.
1Countries that suffered a crisis in 1997 are in bold. The countries are ordered by severity of crisis.
2Probabilities of currency crisis over a 24-month horizon, from average KLR model for 1996.
3Probabilities of currency crisis over a 24-month horizon, from average of 1996 DCSD results.
4The spread is expressed in basis points. It refers to the difference between the yield on U.S. 
dollar–denominated foreign government eurobonds and the equivalent maturity U.S. treasury bonds.
5Average of S&P and Moody’s ratings, each converted to a numerical rating ranging from 100
(S&P SD) to 0 (S&P AAA or Moody’s Aaa), following Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz (1999). A lower number
means a better rating (unlike Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz).
6Currency risk: “Scores and ratings assess the risk of a devaluation against the dollar of 20 percent
or more in real terms over the two-year forecast period,” following EIU.
7Countries are ranked according to each indicator as well as according to crisis severity (in both
cases a lower number implies a worse actual or predicted crisis). The rank correlation relates these
two rankings.ASSESSING EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS: HOW HAVE THEY WORKED IN PRACTICE?
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Second, there is some evidence that sovereign ratings from agencies such as
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (S&P’s) have also been poor predictors of
recent currency crises.8 The fourth column of Table 2 shows the sovereign ratings
as of the first quarter of 1997, based on a quantitative conversion of Moody’s and
S&P’s ratings, where higher numbers correspond to a better rating. Korea,
Malaysia, and Thailand are the highest-rated countries, while Mexico is relatively
poorly ranked. Indeed, the average rating in the ten most affected countries was
substantially better than in the ten least affected countries.
Other non-model-based predictions of currency crises are surveys of cur-
rency market analysts, such as those prepared by the EIU. The EIU has regularly
produced estimates of currency crisis risk, defined as the risk of a 20 percent real
depreciation of the currency over the two-year forecast horizon.9 These estimates
derive from the analysis of country experts who consider a broad set of quantita-
tive and qualitative factors, ranging from macroeconomic and financial variables
to the strength of the banking system, the quality of economic decision making,
and the stability of the political situation. The estimates are available for a large
number of countries since 1996. As column 5 of Table 2 shows, these EIU fore-
casts gave generally positive assessments to the Asian economies that were about
to suffer from severe episodes. Indeed, countries with higher risk scores in the sec-
ond quarter of 1997 were systematically less likely to have a crisis during the
1997–98 period.10
Along similar lines, there exist surveys of estimates of future exchange rate
changes by foreign exchange traders and specialists in financial institutions and
multinational corporations. Goldfajn and Valdés (1998) examined the surveys by
the Financial Times Currency Forecaster and found that such market participants’
expectations provided no useful early warning of currency crises in a large sample
of emerging markets, or in important cases such as Mexico in 1994 or Thailand 
in 1997.
To summarize, there is little evidence that “market views,” or analysts’views,
as expressed in spreads, ratings, and surveys, are reliable crisis predictors, impor-
tant as they may be in determining market access. This conclusion is illustrated for
the case of Korea in Figure 1, which shows DCSD model predictions as well as
various other indicators of crisis risk.
The results of this round of EWS testing were sufficiently promising to sug-
gest the continued implementation of these models on an ongoing basis, along
with further research and development. The in-sample results were fairly good.
More remarkably, the out-of-sample results were also promising. Here, however,
8See Sy (2003) and Reinhart (2002). As with sovereign spreads, it could be argued that these ratings
are designed to predict default, not currency crisis. Against this, however, is the fact that currency crises
do increase the risk of default and that, because of this, ratings have in fact been downgraded after most
currency crises. This suggests that the rating agencies would have likely downgraded the countries had
they seen the currency crises coming.
9See Economist Intelligence Unit Currency Risk Handbook, June 2001.
10The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts are similarly unsuccessful when compared with crises as
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Sources: Bloomberg, JPMorgan, and IMF staff estimates. Berg and others (2000). DCSD stands for 
Developing Country Studies Division of the IMF in which the model was originally formulated.
1The forward premium is defined as the log of the ratio of the 12-month forward rate to the spot 
exchange rate.
2Spread of Korean Development Bank Eurobond over comparable U.S. treasuries.
3The probability of a crisis over the next 24 months estimated using the DCSD model.
Figure 1. Korea: Forward Exchange Rate Premium, Bond Spread and
Probability of an Exchange Rate Crisis Estimated by the 
DCSD Model, 1996–2000
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the results of the DCSD model results must be discounted, since this model bene-
fited from hindsight in its formulation, though only pre–Asia crisis data were used
to produce the forecasts.11 Moreover, it may be that this good Asia-crisis perfor-
mance was just lucky or, alternatively, that subsequent crisis episodes may have
been sufficiently different that these models stopped working. This suggests an
examination of the recent performance of the EWS models.
How Well Have the EWS Models Done in Practice 
Since Their Implementation in January 1999?
We examine this question in two ways. First, we look at the results of the models
the first time the forecasts were produced “officially” in a forward-looking exer-
cise, in July 1999.12 Second, more systemic measures of the “goodness of fit” of
the models are examined, emphasizing the comparison of in-sample and out-of-
sample model performance, and the trade-off between missing crises and generating
false alarms.
The July 1999 forecasts
Table 3 shows the predicted probabilities of crisis for the DCSD and KLR mod-
els.13 Countries that suffered crises are in bold, with the dates of the crisis noted.
The KLR, and particularly the DCSD, model did fairly well. Both countries with
DCSD probabilities of crisis above 50 percent subsequently had crises, and no cri-
sis country had a probability below 26 percent. Using the models’own definition,
there have been only three crises in the roughly two years since July 1999.
As before, it is useful to compare these forecasts with other indicators and
estimates. Columns 3, 4, and 5 of Table 3 show spreads on dollar-denominated
bonds, sovereign ratings, and the EIU’s currency crisis risk scores, all as of the
second quarter of 1999. The alternative predictors fared better than prior to the
Asia crises but still not well. Spreads are moderately higher, at 549, for the three
crisis countries compared with 462 for the others. The average sovereign rating is
56 for the three crisis countries, while it is slightly worse, at 55, for the rest of the
countries. The EIU estimates, in contrast, are substantially better here than they
were before the Asia crises. For example, the average risk score of the three crisis
countries was 59, compared with 42 for the others.14
11The main benefit from this hindsight was the inclusion of short-term debt and reserves as a predic-
tive variable. The original KLR model had focused on M2/reserves instead. This latter variable also works,
though not as well.
12Appendix II explains how in-sample and out-of-sample periods are determined for each of the mod-
els considered.
13The two private sector models monitored at that time, GS and CSFB, forecast only over a one- to
three-month horizon. The snapshot of the first “official” July 1999 results is thus not informative. Their
performance is examined in the discussion of overall goodness of fit, below.
14Using the EIU’s own crisis definition, the forecasts perform somewhat worse, with the average risk
for the crisis countries below the average for the non-crisis countries.Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Pattillo
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Table 3. Crisis Probabilities According to Different Models as of July 1999
Economist
Country1 KLR2 DCSD3 Spread4 Ratings5 Intelligence Unit6
Colombia (Aug 99) 42 61 544 45 42
Turkey (Feb 01) 45 50 554 68 58
Zimbabwe (Aug 00) 24 26 n.a. n.a. 77
Bolivia n.a. 36 n.a. n.a. 42
Chile 11 36 n.a. n.a. 29
Venezuela 42 34 n.a. n.a. 58
Argentina 20 31 471 58 62
Peru 32 26 210 58 35
Uruguay 32 23 216 45 36
Brazil 24 21 451 68 47
Mexico 14 19 296 55 42
Pakistan n.a. 14 2,270 90 69
Jordan 14 14 n.a. n.a. 34
South Africa 32 9 141 48 40
India 11 9 n.a. n.a. 38
Sri Lanka n.a. 7 n.a. n.a. 51
Israel 11 6 78 30 30
Thailand 32 4 192 48 41
Philippines 14 3 401 50 28
Malaysia 11 3 174 45 36
Indonesia 32 1 872 78 50
Korea, Rep. of 24 1 238 45 30
Average
Crisis countries 37 46 549 56 59
Non-crisis countries 22 16 462 55 42
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: KLR: Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998); DCSD: Developing Country Studies
Division of the IMF (Berg and others, 2000).
1Countries with crises between June 1999 and June 2001 are in bold.
2Probabilities of currency crisis over a 24-month horizon, from KLR model. Estimated using
data through March 1999, except for Brazil, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe
(December 1998); Chile and Israel (May 1999); India and Indonesia (January 1999); Malaysia (April
1999); South Africa (February 1999); and Turkey (November 1998).
3Probabilities of currency crisis over a 24-month horizon from CSFB model. Estimated through
March 1999, except for R.B. de Venezuela (December 1998), Malaysia (January 1999), and Mexico,
Thailand, and Indonesia (April 1999).
4The spread is expressed in basis points. It refers to the difference between the yield on U.S. dollar–
denominated foreign government eurobonds and the equivalent maturity U.S. treasury bonds.
5Average of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s ratings, each converted to a numerical rat-
ing ranging from 100 (S&P SD) to 0 (S&P AAA or Moody’s Aaa), following Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz
(1999). A lower number means a better rating (unlike Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz).
6Currency risk: “Sources and ratings assess the risk of a devaluation against the dollar of 20 per-
cent or more in real terms over the two-year forecast period,” following Economist Intelligence Unit
(2001).ASSESSING EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS: HOW HAVE THEY WORKED IN PRACTICE?
475
The improved performance of the non-model-based indicators compared with
before the Asia crisis, combined with the low incidence of crises over the out-of-
sample period, suggests that the challenge for the models over this period was
more to avoid a large number of false alarms than to call otherwise unforeseen
crises.
The distinction between sovereign, or default, risk and currency crisis risk
surely plays an important role in explaining the performance of ratings and spreads
in some important recent cases—a role that it did not play in the Asia crises.
Colombia’s crisis in August 1999 involved a drop in the exchange rate as the coun-
try abandoned a crawling band exchange rate regime, but there was little subse-
quent concern about sovereign default. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that the
ratings and spreads do not predict this incident. Conversely, Pakistan suffered a
debt crisis but had no currency crisis over the period, and its exceedingly high
spreads, which started to widen after the economic sanctions following the nuclear
tests in 1998, greatly increase the non-crisis-country average.15
Overall goodness of fit since January 1999
A look at the goodness of fit of the models over the entire out-of-sample period
provides a more systematic assessment of the models (see Box 2 for details on
these measures). The computation of goodness-of-fit measures requires selecting
a cutoff probability value, above which the prediction is classified as an “alarm,”
implying that the model expects a crisis to ensue at some point along the predic-
tion horizon. The threshold probability for an alarm can be chosen to minimize a
loss function that weighs two types of errors: failing to predict a crisis and issuing
a crisis alarm that does not materialize.
The specification of the loss function implies a decision on how much weight
to give to both types of mistakes. The relative weights depend implicitly on the
cost imputed to each type of error. From the point of view of an institution con-
cerned with the stability of the international financial system and the well-being
of the individual economies that are part of the global system, it would seem that
the highest priority would be never to fail to predict a crisis. After all, the very pur-
pose of using EWS models is to prevent currency crises or at least lessen their
impact by being able to respond early and in a well-planned fashion. This would
argue for choosing a low cutoff probability. In such case, however, the EWS model
would be prone to generate a high number of false alarms; namely, crisis predic-
tions that do not materialize. This would impair the credibility of the model and
dampen the inclination to take aggressive policy action to prevent a possible cri-
sis. Throughout this chapter, equal weight is placed on the share of alarms that are
false and the share of crises that are missed, although the issue could be explored
further both in the evaluation and the estimation of the models.16 From the point
15Excluding Pakistan, the average spread for non-crisis countries declines to 312 from 462.
16Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999), who employ a similar loss-function approach in looking at
banking crisis prediction, discuss the relative weights in terms of the costs of policies and regulations to
increase the resilience of the banking system versus the costs of rescuing failed institutions.Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Pattillo
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Box 2. Goodness-of-Fit Measures and Trade-Offs
Early warning systems (EWSs) typically produce a predicted probability of crisis.
In evaluating their performance, it would be simple and informative to compare
these predicted probabilities with actual crisis probabilities. Because the latter 
are not directly observable, goodness-of-fit calculations measure how well the 
predicted probabilities compare with the subsequent incidence of crisis. The first
step is to convert predicted probabilities of crisis into alarms; that is, signals that 
a crisis will ensue within 24 months (assuming that is the model’s horizon). An
alarm is defined as a predicted probability of crisis above some threshold level 
(the cutoff threshold). Then each observation (a particular country in a particular
month) is categorized as to whether it is an alarm (i.e., whether the predicted prob-
ability is above the cutoff threshold) and also according to whether it is an actual
pre-crisis month.
The threshold probability for an alarm can be chosen to minimize a “loss func-
tion” equal to the weighted sum of false alarms (as a share of total tranquil periods)
and missed crises (as a share of total crisis periods). In this paper, equal weight is
placed on the share of alarms that are false and the share of crises that are missed.
(The former might be thought of as Type 1 errors and the latter as Type 2 errors, if
the null hypothesis is no crisis.) A higher weight on missed crises would imply a
lower cutoff threshold for calling a crisis, and the model would generate both fewer
missed crises and more false alarms. Note that only in-sample information can be
used to calculate a threshold for actual forecasting purposes. When using the model
out of sample to make predictions, however, there is no guarantee that another
threshold would not provide better goodness of fit.
The columns of Table 4 and Table 5 show how the signals from the various
models compare with actual outcomes, over various periods. Each number in the
goodness-of-fit table represents the number of observations that satisfy the criteria
listed in the rows and columns. For example, for the Developing Country Studies
Division (DCSD) model (Table 4, column 7) over the January 1999 to December
2000 period, there were a total of 443 tranquil months, and for 90 of them the 
probability was above the cutoff threshold.
From this table various measures of accuracy can be calculated. For example,
the percentage of crises correctly called is equal to the number of observations for
which the alarm was sounded and a crisis in fact ensued divided by the total number
of actual crises. The footnotes to Table 4 define these various measures.
It is possible that one model might do better when great weight is placed on
avoiding false alarms; that is, when cutoff thresholds are relatively high, while
another might excel when the optimal cutoff threshold is low. This turns out not
generally to be the case for the models examined here. To demonstrate this, figures
can be produced that show how the models perform for any cutoff and independent
of the loss function chosen. For a given model over a given sample, each candidate
cutoff threshold produces a certain percentage of crises correctly called and per-
centage of false alarms. For example, a cutoff of 0 produces 100 percent crises cor-
rectly called but also 100 percent false alarms (as a share of tranquil periods),
because the model would predict a crisis every time, while a cutoff of 100 produces
0 percent crises correctly called but 0 percent false alarms, because the model will
never predict a crisis. The upper panel of Figure 2 traces all these points for eachASSESSING EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS: HOW HAVE THEY WORKED IN PRACTICE?
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of view of a private investor, although the trade-off between missed crises and
false alarms also exists, the evaluation of cost and benefits may be easier, as it is
directly related to the returns on different asset positions. In this case, one can sus-
pect a bias toward a loss function that predicts crises more often because, as has
been observed, interest differentials are never high enough to offset the impact of
a large depreciation that takes place over a very short period.
A first result is that the in-sample goodness of fit of the models has also been
reasonably stable as new data have come in, as Table 4 shows. For example, con-
sider the results for the DCSD model when estimated for Berg and others (2000)
in 1998 (column 1) with the same model when used to produce the first set of
“official” internal forecasts, produced in July 1999 (column 5). The model’s accu-
racy is actually slightly improved over the longer period. Moreover, the models
themselves have remained fairly stable as new data have come in and as the coun-
try coverage has changed slightly. For the DCSD model, for example, the values
and statistical significance of the coefficients have not changed much.
Box 2. (Concluded)
cutoff between 1 and 100, for the DCSD and the Kaminsky-Lizondo-Reinhart
(KLR) models over the in-sample period. Points that are closer to the lower right
are unambiguously preferred for any loss function, in that the percentage of crises
correctly called is higher while the percentage of false alarms is lower. As shown 
in the figure, the DCSD model dominates for all cutoff frequencies, in that the
DCSD curve lies to the right and below the KLR curve. For any given percentage
of crises correctly called, the DCSD model calls fewer false alarms. Figures 3
through 6 show similar results, though they each show one model’s in-sample 
and out-of-sample results.
Another way to see how models compare that does not depend on the cutoff is
the loss function graph shown in the lower panel of Figure 3. This shows how the
models perform for various cutoff thresholds, for a given loss function. To read this
figure, note that the loss function is the number of false alarms (in percent of total
tranquil periods) plus the number of missed crises (in percent of total pre-crisis peri-
ods). A loss function value of 50, for example, implies 20 percentage points fewer
false alarms and/or missed crises than a loss function of 70.
An alternative approach would be to apply quadratic probability scores (QPSs)
to evaluate goodness-of-fit, as is standard in the literature on evaluation of business
cycle forecasts (Diebold and Rudebusch, 1989), which in turn derives from the
weather forecast evaluation literature (see Diebold and Lopez, 1996, for a survey of
the forecast evaluation literature). In the context of EWS forecast evaluation, the
QPS measure, which is an analog of a mean-squared error, was applied by Berg and
Pattillo (1999b). A shortcoming of QPSs, however, is that the differences between
models are hard to evaluate because there are no probability distributions available
for them. It is not possible to tell if one model beats another by a statistically signifi-
cant margin. Moreover, QPSs do not provide an intuitive interpretation of model
performance as do the loss functions used in this paper.Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Pattillo
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Figure 2. DCSD1 and KLR2 in Sample Forecasts
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Notes: See Box 2 for an explanation. Point A corresponds to the cutoff that minimizes the loss function 
in-sample for the DCSD model. Point B indicates the same point for the KLR model.
1Berg and others (2000). DCSD stands for Developing Country Studies Division of the IMF in which 
the model was originally formulated.
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What about out-of-sample performance? As Appendix II explains, the out-of-
sample period for the KLR and DCSD models extends from January 1999 through
December 2000, since it is too early to fully judge more recent forecasts. For the
private sector GS and CSFB models, which have three-month and one-month hori-
zons, respectively, it is possible to look at goodness of fit through April and August
2001, respectively.
The out-of-sample results vary substantially by model. The KLR model per-
forms better out of sample than in sample, calling 58 percent of pre-crisis months
correctly. The forecasts were highly informative: when the crisis probability was
below the cutoff, a crisis ensued only 9 percent of the time, compared with 35 per-
cent of the time when the crisis probability was above the cutoff. The DCSD
model’s performance deteriorated substantially over this sample period, with only
31 percent of pre-crisis months correctly called. The model remained somewhat
informative, with crises following above-cutoff signals 22 percent of the time and
below-cutoff signals only 14 percent of the time.
Figures 3 and 4 give a more complete picture of the models’performance. The
top panel of Figure 3 shows, for example, that the DCSD model has more false
alarms out of sample than in sample for all cutoff levels. At the in-sample optimal
cutoff, the model has about the same fraction of false alarms but calls many fewer
crises correctly. The bottom panel shows that a much higher cutoff (around 50 per-
cent) would have been desirable. It would have avoided many false alarms with-
out increasing the number of missed crises very much. This is reflected in the top
panel for the DCSD model, where the out-of-sample curve lies on the in-sample
curve in the neighborhood of point C, which corresponds to a cutoff probability of
47 percent.
The out-of-sample period studied in this paper was comparatively calm.
According to the specific definition applied in the models, there were two crises
per year during the recent period, while the average number of crises per year in
the estimation period is almost three. It is perhaps not surprising then that the mod-
els tended to predict the crises well in the recent period, but that they also regis-
tered a comparatively high number of false alarms; that is, crisis predictions that
did not materialize.
Of course, it is impossible to know until it is too late what the best cutoff prob-
ability to call crises is. However, the successful goodness-of-fit performance of the
models for some cutoffs does imply that the models were able to rank the obser-
vations reasonably well according to crisis probability, with the higher probabili-
ties assigned to observations that correspond to pre-crisis months.
How statistically good (in the case of KLR) or bad (in the case of DCSD) are
these results? Table 4 also shows the results of regressing the actual value of the
crisis variable on the model’s predicted probability of crisis for various models and
sample periods. Thus, we run a regression of the form
where c24it = 1 if there is a crisis in the 24 months after period t (for country i) and
0 otherwise. PredProbit is the predicted crisis probability for period t and country
c it it it 24 =+ + αβ ε *, PredProbAndrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Pattillo
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Notes: See Box 2 for an explanation. Point A corresponds to the cutoff that minimizes the loss 
function in sample. Point B indicates the out-of-sample results corresponding to the same cutoff. Point C 
corresponds to a cutoff of 47 percent.
1Berg and others (2000). DCSD stands for Developing Country Studies Division of the IMF, the 
Division in which the model was originally formulated.
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B Optimal in-sample cutoff
Notes: See Box 2 for an expanation. Point A corresponds to the cutoff that minimizes the loss 
function in-sample. Point B indicates the out-of-sample results corresponding to the same cutoff.
1Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998).
Figure 4. KLR1 ForecastsAndrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Pattillo
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i. For informative forecasts, β should be significant; a coefficient of 1 implies that
they are unbiased.17
The regression results confirm the strong out-of-sample KLR forecasts and
suggest that the data are not revealing for the DCSD model. First, the strong KLR
and DCSD in-sample results are clear. The estimated β is always statistically dif-
ferent from 0 and a value of 1 cannot be rejected. Turning to the recent out-of-
sample period, the KLR model’s forecasts are highly significant, while the hypoth-
esis that the true β is 1 cannot be rejected. The DCSD forecasts are not significant
at the traditional confidence levels, with a p-value for β=0 of 12 percent. However,
the data are more consistent with the hypothesis that the forecasts are accurate than
that they are useless: the p-value for β=1 is 31 percent.
As suggested by the fact that neither the hypothesis that β=0 nor that β=1
can be decisively rejected, the tests lack power. This in turn reflects the small
amount of information in the out-of-sample period. We illustrate this lack of
power by carrying out the following simulation exercise. We suppose that, in fact,
the crisis probabilities in the out-of-sample period result from a process that is
exactly as described by the DCSD model, and use the DCSD model to generate
“data” on which to test the value of the coefficient β. The “data” we create imply
that β=1 and any remaining errors are a result of noise inherent in the data-
generating process—the forecasts are as good as they could be. We then simulate
the data-generating process implied by the estimated DCSD model 500 times,
creating 500 sets of out-of-sample observations and associated model forecasts.
We ask how often these ideal forecasts would look as bad as those actually pro-
duced by the DCSD model using the true out-of-sample data. The answer is that
for these ideal forecasts, the hypothesis that β=0 would not be rejected 28 per-
cent of the time.
Neither of the short-horizon private sector models performs well (Table 5 and
Figures 5 and 6).18 Even though in-sample goodness of fit was adequate, the
17We  estimate this regression using ordinary least squares (OLS) with heteroskedasticity- and 
autocorrelation-corrected (HAC) standard errors. This solves two sorts of problems. First, the c24 and
PredProb variables are highly serially correlated, which causes the OLS standard errors to be incorrect.
Monte Carlo exercises suggest that in our setup, the OLS standard errors are substantial underestimates
but that a HAC correction largely solves this problem. Second, the c24 variable is qualitative, resulting
in a heteroskedastic  , as is well known from the “linear probability” literature. The usual solution is to
run a probit or logit regression. Here, though, the relationship between PredProb and c24 will be linear
under either the null (with β=0) or the alternative (with β=1). The heteroskedasticity is of known form,
suggesting the use of feasible generalized least squares estimators (FGLS). However, some observations
will produce negative variances. The usual solution is to apply some ad hoc adjustment to these observa-
tions, such as dropping them. Our own experience and some Monte Carlo exercises confirm much earlier
conclusions that these procedures are unsatisfactory, and suggest that OLS with HAC standard errors pro-
duces reasonable results with only a small loss of efficiency compared with Generalized Least Squares
(GLS). (See Judge and others (1982) on the linear probability model.) Berg and Coke (2004) discuss sim-
ilar problems in the estimation of EWS models themselves. Harding and Pagan (2003) address related
issues in a different context.
18Each model’s own definition of crisis is used to evaluate its performance. See Box 1 on crisis 
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Notes: See Box 1 for an explanation. Point A corresponds to the cutoff that minimizes the loss 
function in-sample. Point B indicates the out-of-sample results corresponding to this same cutoff.
1Goldman-Sachs (Ades, Masih, and Tenengauzer, 1998) and authors’ calculations.
Figure 5. GS1 Model ForecastsAndrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Pattillo
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Figure 6. CSFB1 Model Forecasts
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Notes: See Box 1 for an explanation. Point A corresponds to the cutoff that minimizes the loss 
function in-sample. Point B indicates the out-of-sample results corresponding to this same cutoff.
1Credit Suisse First Boston (Roy and Tudela, 2000) and authors’ calculations.ASSESSING EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS: HOW HAVE THEY WORKED IN PRACTICE?
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models’ out-of-sample forecasts deteriorate sharply.19 The statistical tests reflect
this, in that the forecasts are not significant predictors of actual crisis incidence out
of sample. Again, the data are not completely definitive, particularly for the GS
model. Here, the p-value for the hypothesis that the forecasts should be given no
weight is 0.17, while the p-value that the forecasts are unbiased predictors of cri-
sis risk is 0.28.
All these results should be interpreted cautiously. The number of crises actu-
ally observed has been limited. This translates into a small effective sample size.20
In this context, small changes in sample can make a large difference in the goodness-
of-fit indicators yielded by the models. A previous version of this paper found that
the DCSD model forecasts performed as well in the January to June 1999 to out-
of-sample period as they did in sample.
The private sector models set out to accomplish a distinctly different task than
DCSD or KLR did; namely, to predict the timing of a crisis with precision. The
adoption of a shorter horizon may make prediction easier, since signs of crisis may
emerge more clearly right before a crisis. On the other hand, the exact timing of a
currency crisis may be more difficult to predict than vulnerability over an interval
of time as wide as two years, in part because of the possibility of multiple equi-
libria and a resulting difficulty in predicting the timing of speculative attacks. In
any case, the comparison of the short-horizon models and the long-horizon mod-
els is not direct and must be treated with caution.21
A final and necessary qualification is that the terms “false alarm” and “missed
crisis” should not be taken too literally. An alarm is considered false if no crisis in
fact ensues. However, this signal may have been appropriate. First, the crisis defi-
nitions employed may fail to classify some events as crises that we might well want
a model to warn about. Second, a warning may be followed by policy adjustment
or luck that causes the crisis to be avoided; the warning might nonetheless have
been useful. Indeed, an examination of the 90 observations that generated false
19This assessment is based on this paper’s metric for evaluating performance. CSFB’s own method
uses a different loss function to choose a cutoff, putting more weight on missed crises. In effect, their
objective is to minimize false alarms, subject to achieving a certain share of correctly called crises. Also
note that CSFB uses the probabilities in a more complex way to generate various levels of risk warnings
for clients, based on changes in the probabilities over the most recent one to six months. We have not eval-
uated how well this system does in predicting crises.
20To  put this problem another way, the pre-crisis observations and the predicted probabilities are
highly serially correlated; adjusting for this factor greatly increases the standard errors in the model. This
also implies that adding observations through extending the time dimension of the out-of-sample period is
not as helpful as the increase in the number of total observations would suggest.
21In addition, there are some differences in the way the out-of-sample forecasts were generated. Those
for the GS model come directly from contemporary monthly publications, so they necessarily reflect incom-
plete data that had to be supplemented with estimates for various predictive variables. For example, the
January 1999 crisis probability (for April 1999) uses GS estimates of data as of January 1999. The CSFB
estimates, in contrast, may use revised predictive variables, although it is not clear how substantial the revi-
sions are. This issue is somewhat less serious for the DCSD and KLR models because they forecast over
much longer horizons. The July 1999 forecasts, for example, made use of data available only through April
for many series, but because the forecast horizon is so long, the use of such data did not make the forecasts
obsolete.Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Pattillo
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alarms in the January 1999 to December 2000 period in the DCSD model suggests
that half of them (46) can be readily classified in one or the other of these cases.22
III. Summary and Conclusions
Since the beginning of 1999, IMF staff has been systematically tracking, on an
ongoing basis, various models developed in-house and by private institutions, as
part of its broader forward-looking vulnerability assessment. This paper looks in
detail at the performance of these models in practice.
We have monitored two long-horizon in-house models (DCSD and KLR) and
two short-horizon private sector models (GS and CSFB) since 1999. This paper
has analyzed the forecasts made between January 1999 and December 2000 by the
24-month-horizon DCSD and KLR models, between January 1999 and April 2001
by the GS model, and between April 2000 and June 2001 by the CSFB model.
These forecasts were “pure” out-of-sample forecasts in that no information about
actual outcomes was used in the forecasts or, more generally, in the development
or estimation of the models themselves.
The results are mixed. The forecasts of the KLR model are statistically and
economically significant predictors of actual crises. The forecast accuracy in the
out-of-sample period is only slightly inferior to the accuracy in the estimation
period. The DCSD model performs substantially worse out of sample than in sam-
ple. The forecasts are still somewhat informative, however, and the hypothesis that
the forecasts are unbiased and informative is more likely (p-value = 0.31) than the
hypothesis that the model’s forecasts were useless (p-value = 0.12). The ambigu-
ous statistical results reflect the fact that the out-of-sample period contains 528
observations but only eight crises; the latter number is important in determining
the amount of information in the data.23
On the whole, the short-horizon private sector models we examined performed
poorly out of sample, despite stellar in-sample performance. Both sets of crisis
predictions were largely uninformative—the probability of a crisis was about the
same whether the forecast probability was above a cutoff threshold or not.
At least for the KLR model and the DCSD model, the forecasts were statisti-
cally significant predictors of crisis (only at the 12 percent level for the latter).
This means that they are likely better than could have been produced throwing
darts at a a suitable target. How do they compare, though, to the more challenging
benchmark of alternative forecasts? Here we have compared them with bond
spreads, agency ratings, and, perhaps most relevant for IMF work, overall cur-
rency crisis risk scores published by analysts. We find that during the Asia crisis,
these alternative indicators fared very poorly, much worse than the DCSD and
22The countries involved in these 46 observations of technically false, but still useful, alarms are
Argentina, Chile (before July 1999), Pakistan, Turkey, Uruguay, and República Bolivariana de Venezuela.
23The serial correlation in the data also reduces the effective amount of information, as discussed in
note 17. An earlier version of this paper analyzed data through end-1999 and found that the DCSD model
performed as well out of sample as in sample. This dependence of the results on the sample is captured by
the low power of the tests.ASSESSING EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS: HOW HAVE THEY WORKED IN PRACTICE?
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KLR EWS models. During the recent period, the non-model forecasts performed
somewhat better, though still generally not as well as the models.
Overall, these results reinforce the view that EWS models are not accurate
enough to be used as the sole method to anticipate crises. However, they can con-
tribute to the analysis of vulnerability in conjunction with more traditional surveil-
lance methods and other indicators. It is worth underlining the relatively high
standard to which these models are being held. It is plausible to suppose that com-
prehensive assessments by informed analysts, based on all available qualitative
and quantitative information, must be better than the inevitably simple EWS mod-
els. But the evidence we have examined with respect to this question is not encour-
aging concerning these more comprehensive assessments.
The advantage of EWS models lies in their objective, systematic nature. The
models process data in a mechanical way and are not clouded by conventional
misperceptions or biases based on past experiences. For example, as shown in
Section II, Korea, a country with one of the most successful economic records in
recent years, was showing some serious signs of vulnerability to an external crisis
in 1996–97, according to EWS models. However, possibly because of that suc-
cessful record, analysts and markets did not signal any increase in risk prior to the
December 1997 currency crisis.
Over the Asia crisis periods, the best EWS models did dramatically better than
non-model-based predictors, such as spreads, ratings, and assessments of informed
analysts. Over the more recent period, the performance of some of these alterna-
tive predictors improved somewhat, so that the relative superiority of the models
declined. This suggests that recent crises have simply not been the surprises that the
Asia crises were, either because they were easier to predict or because analysts’
sensitivity was heightened. In general, most analysts foresaw important risks in the
crisis countries in question. The expected strength of the EWS models is in iden-
tifying important crisis risks that other forms of analysis do not expose, while
avoiding an excessive number of false alarms that would dilute the credibility of
the crisis signals. The crises of 1999–2002 have not, fortunately, afforded this
opportunity.
Looking at events of the past few years, it is clear that several developments
are under way that are changing the landscape for currency crisis prediction mod-
els. First, we have observed a resurgence of crises in which sovereign and domes-
tic debt dynamics play a central role. Debt and currency crises are related but
distinct: most debt crises are associated with currency crises, but the reverse is not
true. Recent work has, appropriately, focused on predicting these sorts of crises.24
A second trend is the increased importance of floating exchange rates in
emerging markets. Over the past decade, in large part in the aftermath of currency
crises, there has been a sharp increase in the number of emerging market countries
in which the capital account is broadly open, the de jure exchange rate regime is
floating, and there is substantial de facto flexibility as well. Ten years ago, perhaps
24Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) and Manasse, Roubini, and Schimmelpfennig (2003) look at
determinants of debt crises. Hemming, Kell, and Schimmelpfennig (2003) look at fiscal vulnerabilities in
emerging market economies. Sy (2003) emphasizes that debt and currency crises are distinct events.Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Pattillo
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only South Africa fit these characteristics among large developing countries. Now
many, including Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Korea, Mexico, Poland, and Thailand,
have joined the ranks. This sort of arrangement, often augmented by an inflation-
targeting monetary policy, is indeed now more the rule than the exception for such
countries. Going forward, what does this imply for currency crisis models?
In principle, a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate can happen under a float-
ing exchange rate regime as much as under any other regime. Although floating rate
regimes would help to avoid situations of extreme overvaluation, particularly those
driven by policy inconsistencies, the economies could still be vulnerable to sudden
changes in market sentiment, unsustainable levels of debt, and financial sector
weaknesses, among other factors. Moreover, regimes that are broadly floating may,
under speculative attack, evolve toward de facto pegs as policymakers resist the
downward pressure on the currency. In fact, according to the IMF’s de jure classi-
fication, there is no evidence that floating rates have been more resistant to currency
crises.25 We draw no firm conclusions here. We suspect, though, that painful cur-
rency crises will remain a feature of emerging markets for the foreseeable future.
APPENDIX I
Description of Early Warning System (EWS) 
Models and Specification Issues
Models Implemented at the IMF
Kaminsky-Lizondo-Reinhart (KLR) model
Perhaps the most prominent model for predicting currency crises proposed before the Asia cri-
sis is the indicators approach of Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) (KLR), who moni-
tor a large set of monthly indicators that signal a crisis whenever they cross a certain threshold.
The model attempts to predict the probability of a crisis within the next 24 months, where a
crisis occurs when there are extreme changes in a weighted average of the monthly exchange
rate depreciation and reserve loss. A variable-by-variable approach is chosen so that a surveil-
lance system based on the method would provide assessments of which variables are “out of
line.” In addition to overvaluation, the current account, reserve losses, and export growth, the
model also includes reserves to broad money as a measure of reserve adequacy and several
monetary variables, such as domestic credit growth, real interest rates, and excess M1 bal-
ances.26 The information from the separate variables is combined, using each variable’s fore-
casting track record, to produce a composite measure of the probability of crisis (Kaminsky,
1999). IMF staff has implemented a version of the KLR model, supplemented with several
additional variables.
25A more complete analysis should correct for the influence of other factors that contribute to currency
crises and would consider de facto classifications such as those of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001)
and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
26Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000) add some new indicators and update the KLR model.
They find that the best monthly indicators for predicting a currency crisis were real exchange rate appre-
ciation, a banking crisis, a decline in equity prices, a fall in exports, a high ratio of broad money to reserves,
and a recession, while the best annual indicators were a large current account deficit relative to both GDP
and investment.ASSESSING EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS: HOW HAVE THEY WORKED IN PRACTICE?
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Developing Country Studies Division (DCSD) model
The current structure of the DCSD model has been influenced by the path of its development.
Its origins were a project testing the out-of-sample performance of the KLR and other models
in predicting the Asian crisis. Later work tested the usefulness of interpreting predictive vari-
ables in terms of discrete thresholds, the crossing of which signals a crisis (Berg and Pattillo,
1999a and 1999b). Using the same crisis definition and prediction horizon as KLR, but embed-
ding the KLR approach into a multivariate probit regression, the authors found that a better sim-
ple assumption is that the probability of crisis goes up linearly with changes in the predictive
variables. The variables are measured in percentile form; that is, relative to their own history.
The resulting “linear” probit model in that paper was composed of five variables: real
exchange rate deviations from trend, the current account to GDP ratio, export growth, reserve
growth, and the level of M2 to reserves. This set of predictor variables was the result of start-
ing with an extensive set of KLR variables, plus our additions, and selecting the most impor-
tant variables through a specification search process.
Because the role of short-term debt in weak financial systems was brought to the forefront
by the Asian crises, a measure of short-term debt to reserves was added to the model (Berg and
others, 2000). It was found to be highly significant, while the ratio of M2 to reserves lost its
significance and was dropped from the model, resulting in the current five-variable DCSD
model.27
Policy Development and Review (PDR) model
A third EWS model recently developed by the IMF is the PDR model. This EWS adds balance
sheet variables and proxies for standards to the DCSD model (Mulder, Perrelli, and Rocha,
2002). The following variables have been deemed important in predicting the probability of a
crisis: at the corporate level, leveraged financing and a high ratio of short-term debt to working
capital; balance sheet indicators of bank and corporate debt to foreign banks as a share of
exports; and a legal regime variable proxying shareholder rights.
The corporate sector data are available only on an annual basis and with a significant lag.
These variables are often slow moving, however, so they can still contribute to forecasting accu-
racy. More up-to-date data, as well as a larger and more stable underlying sample of corpora-
tions, would increase the analytical and forecasting usefulness of the model.
Private Sector Models
The interest of investment banks in developing EWSs as tools for advising their clients has fluc-
tuated, based on what is “in fashion” and whether crises are in the daily headlines. Following the
Asian crisis, most major banks developed in-house models attempting to predict currency
crashes. These models were designed either for explicit use in advising on foreign currency trad-
ing strategies, or, more generally, to assess values and risks in emerging market currencies and
supplement economic forecasts provided to investors. Since that time, a number of these systems
have ceased operation: Lehman Brothers has abandoned its Currency Jump Probability model;
Citicorp no longer implements its Early Warning System for anticipating balance-of-payments
crises in Latin America; and JPMorgan has substituted a simple weighted vulnerability index for
its Event Risk Indicator model. However, as volatility in emerging markets ratcheted up again in
late 2000 and in 2001, a number of new private models were brought out. For example, Deutsche
27The model uses mainly monthly data, but also some quarterly or, for some countries, annual data.
These latter series are interpolated or extrapolated to generate monthly crisis predictions.Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Pattillo
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Bank introduced its Deutsche Bank Alarm Clock (DBAC) and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter has
recently set up an Early Warning System for Currency Crises.
Goldman Sachs’s GS-WATCH
IMF staff regularly tracks Goldman Sachs’GS-WATCH model and Credit Suisse First Boston’s
(CSFB) Emerging Markets Risk Indicator (Roy and Tudela, 2000), both of which have been in
operation since 1998. GS-WATCH (Ades, Masih, and Tenengauzer, 1998) predicts the likeli-
hood of a crisis in a three-month period, defined as a weighted average of three-month
exchange rate and reserve changes. The predictions are generated through a logit regression in
which most explanatory variables are converted into zero/one signals. The predictor variables
include macro fundamentals such as measures of credit booms, real exchange rate misalign-
ment, export growth, reserve growth, and external financing requirements, as well as changes
in stock prices, political risk, contagion, and global liquidity. The latter two variables are mea-
sured continuously, making the overall crisis probabilities follow a smoother path. While inclu-
sion of political risk makes sense, the simple zero/one variable (one around the time of
elections, or when a revolution, coup, major riot, or strike takes place) only partially captures
this type of risk. The model is estimated using monthly data, but predictions are updated weekly
for inclusion in analysts’ reports. On a week-to-week basis, changes in the contagion variable
drive much of the movement in the crisis predictions. Contagion is measured for each country
as a weighted average of the changes in the exchange rate and reserve change index for the
other countries in the sample, where the weights are the historical relationships between those
indices across countries.
Credit Suisse First Boston’s Emerging Markets Risk Indicator (CSFB)
CSFB re-specified its model in September 2000, changing some of the predictor variables and
reducing the number of variables (Roy and Tudela, 2000). A logit model predicts the one-
month-ahead probability of a depreciation greater than 5 percent and at least double the pre-
ceding month’s depreciation. The variables are standardized; that is, measured relative to the
country-specific mean and variability for that variable. Many variables similar to those used in
other models are included: real exchange rate deviations from trend; the ratio of debt to exports;
growth in credit to the private sector; output changes; reserves to imports; changes in stock
prices; oil prices; and a regional contagion dummy, measured simply as the number of coun-
tries in the region recently experiencing a crisis.
Deutsche Bank Alarm Clock (DBAC)
The DBAC model defines separate exchange rate and interest rate “events” as depreciations
greater than a certain size (estimated separately for levels ranging from 5 percent to 25 percent)
and increases in money market interest rates of more than 25 percent in a month (Garber,
Lumsdaine, and van der Leij, 2000). It uses a methodology to jointly estimate the probability of
these two types of events, allowing the probability of a simultaneous interest rate event to influ-
ence the likelihood of an exchange rate crisis and the probability of a depreciation event to affect
the prediction of an interest rate crisis. Relatively few predictors are included in the exchange rate
event model: changes in stock prices, domestic credit, industrial production, and real exchange
rate deviations, as well as a contagion variable. All the investment bank models claim to demon-
strate that an investor using trading strategies based on their models could earn substantial prof-
its over a particular period. DBAC adds a twist to these calculations by proposing an “action
trigger” to identify cutoff probability levels at which an alarm should be sounded and investorsASSESSING EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS: HOW HAVE THEY WORKED IN PRACTICE?
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should change their positions. The trigger is calculated to maximize profits, assuming a strategy
in which the investor will be long in the local currency when the probability of a depreciation cri-
sis is below the trigger and short whenever the probability crosses above the trigger.
Specification Issues
EWS models are econometric methods for generating predictions of currency crises, precisely
defined. Although there have long been empirical studies of currency crises, it was not until
after the 1994–95 Mexican tequila crisis that the literature focused on finding methods for pre-
dicting crises, rather than on explaining a particular set of historical crises or testing specific
theories. The largely unexpected Asia crisis, however, provided the real impetus for a new wave
of papers and the development of systems for a continuous monitoring of crisis vulnerabilities
at various institutions.
What is being predicted?
Most would agree that a sudden, large depreciation of the exchange rate constitutes a currency
crisis. Further, a situation of intense pressure on the foreign exchange market, resulting in large
losses of international reserves and/or a hike in domestic interest rates can also be considered
a crisis, even if a step devaluation is avoided. In any event, one may be interested in forecast-
ing both successful (those resulting in an exchange rate depreciation) and unsuccessful attacks
on the currency, so that both types of event would be considered a crisis for the purpose of a
forecasting model. Box 1 discusses the difficulties involved in operationalizing the concept of
currency crisis and how they are addressed in the models considered in this paper. Table A.1
lists crisis dates for the various models for the 1999–2001 period.
What variables should be included?
After identifying a set of crises, the next issue is the choice of a set of variables that may be
useful in predicting crises. Berg and others (2000) survey the literature on currency crises and
look for common symptoms of crises in past episodes. Drawing up a list of potential predictive
variables starts with theoretical models of currency crisis. “First-generation” models focus on
macroeconomic imbalances that lead to a depletion of foreign exchange reserves and make a
devaluation inevitable. In second-generation models, the government weighs the cost and ben-
efits of defending the currency. Because expectations affect the trade-off faced by the policy-
maker, crises may be self-fulfilling, and thus much more difficult to predict. More recent
models stress elements such as market failure in international capital markets and distortions in
domestic financial markets. For example, information failures can lead to investor herding
behavior and contagion, and implicit government guarantees of private sector liabilities can
generate moral hazard and unsustainable implicit deficits.
The theoretical literature suggests classifying variables into three groups: first, macroeco-
nomic fundamentals such as measures of real exchange rate overvaluation, the fiscal deficit,
excess money growth, terms of trade, domestic credit, the current account deficit, and output
growth; and second, variables that gauge a country’s vulnerability to attacks, if, given relatively
weak fundamentals, an attack were to take place. These include measures of the adequacy of
international reserves relative to possible short-run liabilities of external and domestic origin,
external financing needs, and soundness of the financial sector.
The third group of variables is composed of indicators of market expectations or sentiment,
such as interest rate differentials, bond spreads, the forward exchange rate, the number of crises
elsewhere or other contagion channels, and variables representing investors’“risk appetite.”Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Pattillo
496
Table A.1. Crisis Dates According to Different Models
DCSD/KLR Crisis Dates (Jan. 1999–Mar. 2003)
Brazil Jan 99
Colombia Aug 99; Jul 02





GS Crisis Dates (Jul. 1998–Apr. 2001)
Brazil Jul 98–Jan 99; Jun–Jul 99; Mar–May 00; Sep 00; Jan–Apr 01
Bulgaria Jan–Apr 99; Jan–Feb 00; Feb 01
Chile Jun–Aug 99; Mar–Apr 01
China Jul–Aug 98
Colombia Jul–Aug 98; Mar–Jul 99; Mar–May 00
Czech Republic Nov 98–Jan 99
Ecuador Jul–Aug 98; Nov 98–Feb 99; Apr–May 99; Jul–Nov 99; Jan 01
Egypt Jul 99; Sep–Oct 00
Hong Kong SAR Jul–Sep 98; May–Jul 99
Hungary Jul 98
India May 00
Indonesia Dec 98; Jun–Jul 99; Mar–May 00; Jan–Mar 01
Israel Jul–Sep 98; Jul 99
Korea, Rep. of Sep–Nov 00
Malaysia Aug 00
Mexico Jul 98
Peru Jul–Nov 98; Jul 99; Nov 00
Philippines Jul 98; Jun–Jul 99; May–Oct 00
Poland Nov 98; Jul 99; Mar 00
Russia Jul–Nov 98; Jul–Aug 99
South Africa Sep–Oct 00
Singapore Oct 98; Mar 01
Taiwan Province of China Sep–Nov 00; Apr 01
Thailand Jun–Jul 99; Feb–Aug 00
Turkey Sep–Nov 98; Nov 00–Mar 01
CSFB Crisis Dates (Jul. 1998–Aug. 2001)
Brazil Mar 99
Colombia Nov 98; Sep 99
Croatia Apr 99
Czech Republic Apr 99
Ecuador Mar–Apr 99; Aug 99; Nov–Dec 99; Feb 00
Indonesia Jul 98; Mar 99; Oct 99; Jan 00; Nov 00; Jun 01
Israel Dec 98
Korea, Rep. of Feb 01
Mexico Oct 98




Russia Oct–Nov 98; Feb 99; Jun 99; Mar 00
South Africa Aug 98
Slovak Republic Oct 98; Jul 00ASSESSING EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS: HOW HAVE THEY WORKED IN PRACTICE?
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The task of specifying a model with variables that are useful predictors of crisis does not
involve simply assembling all the a priori plausible variables. There is significant danger of
“overfitting” a model by adding more and more variables through “data mining.” Typically, such
a model will explain a particular historical episode of crisis very well, but will have little power
in forecasting the next set of crises. Finding the best method to forecast crisis probabilities argues
for a parsimonious model: a robust set of variables useful for predicting both past and future
crises. There is a deeper problem associated with the statistical one. If the nature of crises
changes from one episode to the next, how can a model be robust to those changes? The answer
is to focus on the symptoms that may be common to all external crisis episodes, even when the
ultimate causes of those crises are different.
It should also be kept in mind that the different indicators are interrelated, so that the inclu-
sion of all of them is not necessary. The indicators may be covered indirectly, in that the vari-
ables employed in the model may capture many of the important manifestations of these other
problems. For example, a large fiscal deficit and high inflation may contribute to the risk of cri-
sis, but may be already accounted for in a model that includes real exchange rate overvaluation
and the current account deficit.
Finally, there are the issues of availability of consistent data over time and across coun-
tries, and at a desirably high frequency. Data on the health of the financial sector, such as rates
of nonperforming loans, is an important example of factors that do not meet those standards.
Political risk is another example of a factor that is intrinsically difficult to measure consistently.
In addition, some variables may not fit well into the structure of a given model. A good exam-
ple is the phenomenon of contagion. The transmission of crises from country to country, par-
ticularly if the mechanism operates through financial channels, seems to occur quite rapidly.
Thus, it is difficult to incorporate contagion in models attempting to predict the likelihood of
crisis over a longer horizon, such as the next two years. Also, there are other idiosyncratic vari-
ables (for example, oil prices) that, while particularly important for some countries, may have
insignificant or contrary effects in other emerging markets.
How do you generate predictions?
Two conceptual questions underlie the choice of a methodology that uses the variables to pre-
dict the crises. First, how should the information content of each explanatory variable be
assessed? One option is the “signaling” approach, in which each indicator is said to issue a 
signal of impending crisis when its value exceeds a particular threshold. For example, if the
country-specific threshold for the ratio of the current account deficit to GDP is 3 percent, a ratio
below 3 percent would not contribute to the risk of crisis, while ratios above 3 percent would
contribute equally to the probability of a crisis. A second option is to introduce the variables
Table A.1. (Concluded)
Sri Lanka Aug 00; Mar 01
Thailand Aug 98; Nov 99
Turkey Jan 99; Apr–May 01; Aug 01
Zimbabwe Jul 98; Oct 98; Mar 99; Oct 00
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: KLR: Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998); DCSD: Developing Country Studies
Division of the IMF (Berg and others, 2000); GS: Goldman Sachs (Ades, Masih, and Tenengauzer,
1998); CSFB: Credit Suisse First Boston (Roy and Tudela, 2000).28The Bank for International Settlements adopts a less common approach, in which, after each variable
is converted to a score from a set scale, the scores are aggregated by summing, using judgmental weights.
29There are also a number of new approaches that are being explored in the literature. For example,
Burkart and Coudert (2000) use linear discriminant analysis; Vlaar (2000) and Fratzscher (2003) develop
switching regime models; and Osband and Van Rijckeghem (2000) use non-parametric methods to iden-
tify safe zones.
30The Goldman Sachs GS-WATCH model also uses predictive indicators in zero/one form, but these
are used as regressors in a logit model. Therefore, the probabilities are less “jumpy” than in the KLR indi-
cators model.
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continuously so that, for example, any small increase in the current account/GDP ratio could
marginally increase the crisis prediction.
It is also necessary to decide how the variables should be measured. Some models include
the variables in raw form, often in growth rates or ratios. Alternatively, the variables could be
measured relative to their history for each country. For example, what matters in the DCSD
model is not the level of the current account deficit per se but whether the deficit corresponds to
a high percentile, relative to the history of the current account deficit in each country considered
individually.
The second question is how to aggregate the information from the different variables into
a single prediction. A method associated with the signaling approach is the calculation of a
composite probability as the weighted sum of the number of indicators that are signaling, where
each indicator is weighted by its reliability in predicting crises.28 An alternative is to use a 
probit (or logit) regression; that is, a regression in which the dependent variable takes the 
value of one when there is a crisis and zero otherwise.29
What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of each approach? The indicator
approach is a popular one, because the framework of monitoring key variables for signs of
“unusual” behavior accords well with the intuition of early warning. But, by evaluating each
variable separately, the method does not consider how an interrelated set of conditions could
make an economy more vulnerable to crisis. A practical difficulty with the indicator approach
is that the crisis probabilities tend to be “jumpy,” as variables move in and out of the signal-
ing territory, making interpretation difficult.30A probit regression addresses many of the prob-
lems with the indicator approach: it generates predictions taking into account the correlation
among all the predictive variables, and allows testing of the statistical significance of indi-
vidual variables. However, because the probit is a nonlinear model, the contribution of a par-
ticular variable depends on the magnitude of all the other variables. This means that the
relationship between changes in the variables themselves and changes in their contribution to
the crisis prediction is not always transparent. In the final analysis, the relative merits of the
two approaches are decided by one key factor: how successful is each method in predicting
crises?
Forecasting horizon
Another important design issue for models that attempt to predict both the cross-country inci-
dence and timing of crises is how far in advance the prediction is to be made. Neither the KLR
nor the DCSD model attempts to predict the exact timing of the crisis (which may be much
harder or impossible), but rather the likelihood that a crisis will occur sometime in the follow-
ing 24 months. The relatively long prediction window could be useful for the IMF because it
would permit sufficient lead time for the authorities to make some policy adjustments. In fact,
research on the DCSD model has shown relatively little difference in the estimated model using
any horizon between nine months and two years.ASSESSING EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS: HOW HAVE THEY WORKED IN PRACTICE?
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Private sector models tend to attempt to predict the probability of a crisis over a shorter
horizon, from one to three months. Some investment banks provide weekly updates of crisis
predictions to their clients, although only a small subset of the variables changes at this fre-
quency. This prediction horizon clearly relates to these firms’objectives of providing advice to
clients participating mainly in foreign exchange markets, who may use shifting short-term fore-
casts to continually adjust their portfolios or hedge their positions. Different sets of variables
may be important predictors at short horizons. For example, the three private sector models
tracked by the IMF staff all include a measure of contagion in the model, reflecting the fact that
contagion can occur relatively rapidly in emerging markets. Changes in stock prices and
domestic credit to the private sector have also been found to be important predictive variables
in all three private sector models.
APPENDIX II
Meaning of In-Sample and Out-of-Sample Periods in 
Early Warning System (EWS) Models
The text emphasizes the distinction between in-sample and out-of-sample performance. This
appendix defines these terms and explains their implementation in this paper. The designer of an
EWS chooses the variables and estimates the parameters of the model in a way that best fits the
observations in a particular sample (the estimation sample). In-sample testing measures how
well the models fit the crises in a particular sample. Good in-sample testing is a sign of a useful
model but must be interpreted cautiously. Good in-sample performance may be a coincidence,
perhaps resulting from a search through a large number of specifications until a good fit occurs
by chance. Moreover, the determinants of crises may vary over time.
In out-of-sample testing, the predictions of an existing model are compared with a new set
of observations not belonging to the estimation sample. An unavoidable difficulty with out-of-
sample testing is that a forecast can be properly judged only after the entire forecast window
has closed. This paper examines the forecasts through June 1999 of the Kaminsky-Lizondo-
Reinhart (KLR) and Developing Country Studies Division (DCSD) models, since it is too early
to fully judge more recent forecasts. A prediction of risks as of August 1999, for example, can-
not be fully judged until September 2001. Before then, it cannot be known whether August
1999 was in fact a pre-crisis or a tranquil month, since it would not yet be known whether a cri-
sis followed within 24 months. Given the two-year model horizon, these forecasts apply to the
two-and-a-half-year period through July 2001. For the private sector Goldman Sachs (GS) and
Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) models, which have three-month and one-month horizons,
respectively, it is possible to look at goodness of fit through April and August 2001.31
Out-of-sample testing should mimic the way a forecasting model would be used in practice.
In the strictest and most interesting form of out-of-sample testing, the modeler has no knowledge
of the out-of-sample observations when generating the forecasts to be tested. Sometimes, in con-
trast, the modeler may withhold the most recent observations from the estimation sample, using
them for subsequent out-of-sample testing. The modeler may nonetheless use information from
these observations to create the model. For example, the DCSD model was estimated over the
pre–Asia crises period and used to predict the Asia crises out of sample in Berg and others
(2000). However, the authors created the model in 1998, after the Asia crises, and they added the
31Similarly, in-sample estimation periods for KLR and DCSD must end some 24 months before the
model is estimated. For example, the in-sample period for the DCSD model in Berg and others (2000) ended
in May 1995, so that the estimation did not reflect knowledge of the Asia crises that began in July 1997.Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Pattillo
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short-term debt and reserves variable because they knew it was likely to be important in explain-
ing the Asia crises.
The start dates for the out-of-sample periods examined in this paper were chosen because
they followed the dates at which they could have informed the estimation of the models. The
KLR and DCSD forecasts examined here, for the period of January 1999 to December 2000,
correspond to the versions used for the “official” internal July 1999 forecasts and subsequent
internal forecasts. The model specifications were finalized in late 1998. The GS out-of-sample
forecasts come directly from contemporary monthly publications over the period of January
1999 to April 2001, so they could not have reflected out-of-sample information. The CSFB out-
of-sample estimates for the April 2000 to June 2001 period were produced in August 2001
using the model as it had been estimated a year earlier, so in principle they should not have been
influenced by out-of-sample events.
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